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"Unto a foreigner thou mayest lend upon interest, but upon thy brother

thou shalt not lend upon interest." 1
I.

INTRODUCTION

When a lender lends money, he expects compensation from the borrower for such loan. If the lender is in the business of lending money,
then he will attempt to maximize profits (or, in these difficult lending
times, minimize losses) by exacting as much compensation as the mar1. Deuteronomy, 23:21.
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ket will bear. While lenders universally wrestle with the marketing
and economic aspects of their business, Texas lenders and their lawyers must also look for legal restraints on the amount of compensation that the lenders may seek from their borrowers. In Texas, a
lender "who contracts for, charges or receives interest . . ." in excess
of that allowed by law may be subject to harsh usury penalties. 2 It
might appear to be a simple matter for a lender to comply with the
usury laws by setting the rate of interest on a loan below the rate
allowed by statute.3 Texas usury statutes, however, broadly define
"interest" as any compensation for the use, forbearance or detention
of money.
As a result of the broad definition of interest, usury problems often
arise when lenders charge borrowers a separate charge or fee that,
although not called interest by the parties, a court will deem to be
interest.' In addition, even if the loan documents do not provide for
excessive interest, the facts surrounding a loan may be such that the
court will deem that the lender has contracted for, charged or received usurious interest.6 Because of the breadth and complexity of
2. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06 (Vernon 1987). In general, a lender who
contracts for, charges or receives usurious interest must forfeit to the borrower three times the
amount of usurious interest contracted for, charged or received plus reasonable attorneys fees.
Id. at art. 5069-1.06(1). If a lender contracts for, charges or receives interest greater than
double the amount of interest allowed by law, then the lender must also forfeit as an added
penalty all principal and interest on the loan, together with reasonable attorneys fees. Id. at
art. 5069-1.06(2). In addition to statutory penalties, a borrower may recover from a lender,
under the common law, all of the interest paid and cancellation of interest not yet paid. Danziger v. San Jacinto Say. Ass'n, 732 S.W.2d 300, 304 (Tex. 1987).
3. In general, a lender and his borrower may agree to a maximum rate of interest of 10%.
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.02 (Vernon 1987). There are, however, numerous
exceptions to this general rule. For example, where the parties do not agree to a stated rate of
interest, the maximum rate is 6%. Id. at art. 5069-1.03. In addition, the parties to a written
contract may agree to a rate of interest not to exceed a ceiling based upon 26-week treasury
bills. Id. at art. 5069-1.04(a)(1). The ceiling under this provision is currently 18%.
4. Id. at 5069-1.01(a). The Texas usury statutes provide that interest is "the compensation allowed by law for the use or forbearance or detention of money .... " Id.
5. For example, a service charge on past due invoices is interest. Flato Elec. Supply Co. v.
Grant, 620 S.W.2d 915, 917 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Similarly, late charges are interest. Dixon v. Brooks, 678 S.W.2d 728, 731 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Generally, regardless of what the amount is termed, if it is
"in fact compensation for the use, forbearance or detention of money [it] is, by definition,
interest." Gonzales County Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Freeman, 534 S.W.2d 903, 906 (Tex. 1976).
6. See, e.g., Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Schuenemann, 668 S.W.2d 324 (Tex. 1984). The
Texas Supreme Court in Schuenemann held that where an acceleration clause in an installment note provided that upon default all of the remainder of the installments would become
due and payable, the note called for the collection of unearned interest. Id. at 329. As a result,
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the Texas usury statutes and the overwhelming number of judicial
interpretations of these statutes, Texas usury law continues to produce surprising twists and turns that create significant risks for lenders making loans in Texas.7
One Texas Supreme Court case has created a recurring nightmare
for lenders who have not fully analyzed the terms of a proposed transaction. In Alamo Lumber Co. v. Gold,I the Texas Supreme Court held
that where a lender, as a condition to a loan, requires the borrower to
assume the obligation of a third party, the amount of the third party's
debt is interest on the borrower's loan. 9 The following is a simple
example of how this problem can arise. Borrower approaches Lender
for a relatively routine loan. During the approval process, Lender discovers that Borrower's brother has defaulted on a loan to Lender.
Lender tells Borrower that it will make the new loan if Borrower will
assume his brother's debt, which Borrower was not previously obligated to pay, and Borrower agrees. Under these facts, a Texas court
would probably hold that the amount of the brother's debt is interest
on Borrower's loan. If the amount of such debt, together with the
stated rate of interest on Borrower's loan, exceeds the applicable interest rate ceiling, then Lender will have contracted for usurious
interest. 10
While the previous example illustrates the principle enunciated by
the court in Alamo Lumber, it does not begin to manifest the realm of
possible situations in which a court may apply Alamo Lumber and
hold that a loan is usurious. For example, suppose that Lender has

the lender, despite never attempting to accelerate the obligations, had contracted for interest in
excess of the amount allowed by Texas law. Id.
7. For example, in Hardwick v. Austin Gallery of Oriental Rugs, Inc., 779 S.W.2d 438,
443-44 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, writ denied), a Texas court suggested that a lender commits
usury under Texas law if the amount of interest charged or received exceeds the amount of
interest contracted for by the parties, even if the amount charged or received does not exceed
the applicable usury ceiling. In addition, the Texas Supreme Court has held that a lender
commits usury if it charges or receives interest during a contractually free interest period.
Steves Sash & Door Co. v. Ceco Corp., 751 S.W.2d 473, 475-76 (Tex. 1988).
8. 661 S.W.2d 926 (Tex. 1984), aff'g, 623 S.W.2d 453 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1981).
9. Id. at 928.
10. It is often difficult to compute an effective rate of interest contracted for, charged, or
received on a loan in order to compare that rate to the maximum rate allowed by Texas law.
Accordingly, the appropriate way to determine whether usury has occurred is to compute the
dollar amount of interest that a lender could contract for, charge, or receive on a particular
loan and compare that amount with the amount of interest actually contracted for, charged, or
received on the loan. Nevels v. Harris, 102 S.W.2d 1046, 1049 (Tex. 1937).
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made a loan to X Company, a corporation, secured by all of X Company's assets. In addition, Lender has made a loan to Shareholder, X
Company's sole shareholder, secured by oil and gas properties. Shareholder is not currently liable for X Company's obligations to Lender.
Both loans have matured and although Lender is willing to renew the
loans, Lender is concerned about X Company's declining profits and
cash flow. Lender informs Shareholder that it will renew his loan on
the condition that he execute a guaranty of the obligations of X Company. Has Lender required Shareholder, as a condition to the renewal
and extension of his loan, to "assume" the debts of a third party?
And, if so, should this assumption constitute "interest" on Shareholder's loans, even if Shareholder's ultimate payment of the assumed
debt either increases X Company's net worth, for the benefit of Shareholder, or provides Shareholder with an enforceable claim against X
Company?
Alternatively, suppose that Lender is concerned about the value of
its collateral on the loan to Shareholder. Lender informs X Company
that it will renew its loan on the condition that X Company grant
Lender a lien in X Company's assets in order to secure Shareholder's
debt to Lender. Is X Company "assuming" Shareholder's debt as a
condition to the renewal of its loan? This article will discuss the potential problems of requiring a borrower to pay, assume, guarantee or
secure the obligations of another.
II.
A.

HOLDING IN ALAMO L UMBER

Co. V. GOLD

1

Facts and Holding

The facts producing the holding in Alamo Lumber are not particularly complicated. The First National Bank of Pleasanton (the Bank)
made a loan to Addie Gold secured by a lien on real property located
in Bexar County, Texas. 2 The proceeds of this note went to Mrs.
Gold's son, Stetson Reed.' 3 Mrs. Gold subsequently defaulted on this
note and the Bank posted the property for a foreclosure sale. I4 At the
same time, Mr. Reed had open account obligations to Alamo Lumber

11.
12.
13.
14.

661 S.W.2d 926 (Tex. 1984), aff'g, 623 S.W.2d 453 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1981).
Alamo Lumber Co., 623 S.W.2d at 454.
Id.
Id.
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Company (the Company) for his purchases of building materials."5
The Company agreed, at the request of Mr. Reed, to purchase Mrs.
Gold's obligations to the Bank under the condition that Mrs. Gold
execute and deliver to the Company a note evidencing the open ac6
count obligations of Mr. Reed.1
Mrs. Gold subsequently sued the Company under Texas usury law
alleging that the Company's requirement that she assume her son's
debt made her loan usurious.17 The jury found that the Company
required Mrs. Gold to assume her son's indebtedness to the Company
as a condition to the Company's purchase and extension of Mrs.
Gold's debt to the Bank. 8 The jury also found, however, that the
Company did not intend to charge or contract for usurious interest.' 9
As a result, the trial court held in favor of the Company. The court of
appeals, however, reversed and rendered in favor of Mrs. Gold and
the Texas Supreme Court affirmed. 0 The basic holding in Alamo
Lumber is that where a lender, as a condition to the making of a loan,
requires the borrower to assume a third party's debt (as opposed to a
preexisting debt of the borrower), the amount of the third party's debt
is interest to be included in the computation of the amount of interest
on the loan.2" The court concluded that the Company's requirement
that Mrs. Gold assume her son's obligations to the Company, which
she was not previously obligated to pay, as a condition to the loan to
Mrs. Gold, made the amount of her son's obligations to the Company
22
interest on her loan.
B.

Historical Precedents
The court in Alamo Lumber approved the holdings in Laid Rite,

15. Id. Mrs. Gold was not, at that time, liable to the Company for the open account
obligations. Id.
16. Id.
17. Alamo Lumber Co., 623 S.W.2d at 455.
18. Id.
19. Id. The jury also found that Mr. Reed was Mrs. Gold's agent in arranging the transaction and that the Company justifiably relied upon Mr. Reed in acquiring the Bank's note and
accepting the new note. Id.
20. Alamo Lumber Co. v. Gold, 661 S.W.2d 926, 927 (Tex. 1984).
21. Id. at 928. See infra notes 120-27 and accompanying text for a discussion of whether
the rule in Alamo Lumber applies to a lender's requirement of a guaranty or a collateral pledge
as a condition to a loan, or a renewal of an existing loan.
22. Id.
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Inc. v. Texas Indus., Inc." and Stephens v. First Bank & Trust,24
which followed the holdings of courts in other states. In Laid Rite,
the court relied upon the rule that where a lender as condition of a
loan requires the borrower to assume the debt of another, the amount
of the assumed debt will be considered interest in determining
whether the loan is usurious. 2 Since a different legal entity, but a
subsidiary of the original lender, made the new loan to the borrower,
the court remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether to
treat the new lender as the alter ego of the original lender.2 6 The
court in Stephens adopted the rule followed by the court in Laid Rite.
The court, however, held that the lender in Stephens required that
someone pay an existing loan, but not that the borrower had to pay
the existing loan.27
Although the rule of Alamo Lumber and Laid Rite may have been
based upon decisions from other states, the essential concept depends
upon the broad definition of "interest" under Texas law. 28 Since any
compensation for the use, forbearance or detention of money will constitute interest, it is not difficult to conclude that a borrower's assumption of another debtor's obligations to a lender will, in many cases, be
the functional equivalent of the borrower's agreement to pay additional compensation or interest to the Lender.
C. Dissenting Opinion
The dissent in Alamo Lumber disagreed with the majority holding,
arguing that the majority did not give the appropriate consideration
to the issue of intent. Justice Barrow, citing cases in other states involving assumption of indebtedness, would hold that the transaction
23. 512 S.W.2d 384 (Tex. Civ. App.-FortWorth 1974, no writ).
24. 540 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
25. Laid Rite, Inc. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 512 S.W.2d 384, 389 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1974, no writ). The court cited several cases from other states, including Vee Bee Serv.
Co. v. Household Fin. Corp., 51 N.Y.S.2d 590 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1944), aff'd, 55 N.Y.S.2d 570
(N.Y. 1945); Curtiss Nat'l Bank v. Solomon, 243 So. 2d 475 (Fla.Dist. Ct. App. 1971); and
Ferdon v. Zarriello Bros, Inc., 208 A.2d 186 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1965).
26. Laid Rite, 512 S.W.2d at 389. The court noted that in the cases in the other states, the
borrower assumed or paid obligations of the third party to the same lender making the loan to
the borrower. Id. See infra notes 60-90 and accompanying text for a discussion of whether the
new loan and the loan assumed must be from the same lender.
27. Stephens v. First Bank Trust, 540 S.W.2d 572, 574 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
28. See supra note 4 and accompanying text for a definition of "interest" under Texas
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is not usurious in the absence of wrongful intent on the part of the
lender.29 In cases where the note is not usurious on its face, the dissent would require a showing of wrongful intent on the part of the
lender to exact usurious interest.3" Furthermore, because of the general principle that the usury statutes are penal in nature and should be
strictly construed, the dissent would not hold that the Company acted
wrongfully. 3
In addition, Justice Barrow stated that the courts in Laid Rite and
Stephens, as well as the majority in Alamo Lumber, misstated the rule
announced in the cases they relied upon.32 The dissent stated that the
rule is that the indebtedness assumed is interest" 'unless the borrower
receives something of benefit for the additional assumption or payment, aside from the use of the money loaned.' "3 The dissent stated
that additional consideration is a critical factor in determining if a
transaction is usurious because "the rule [stated by the majority] is
inapplicable if the borrower fairly may be said to have received some
consideration in addition to the money lent."' 34 The dissent also cited
the traditional Texas rule that "[a] lender may, without violating the
usury law, make an extra charge for any distinctly separate and35additional consideration other than the simple lending of money.
29. Alamo Lumber Co. v. Gold, 661 S.W.2d 926, 929-30 (Tex. 1984) (Barrow, J., dissenting). The majority, rejecting the dissent's intent theory, held that the only intent required is
the intent to make the bargain that was made. Id. at 928. There are a few cases in other states
requiring usurious intent in order to hold that the assumption of indebtedness is interest.
Schreiber v. Thistle, Inc., 437 N.Y.S.2d 596 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981); see also McCullough v.
Snow, 432 P.2d 811 (N.M. 1967). Texas courts appear to be bound to the principle that only
intent to make the bargain made is necessary. See Alamo Lumber Co., 661 S.W.2d at 928;
Ballin v. Poston Home Care Center Co., 749 S.W.2d 164, 169 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988,
writ denied).
30. Alamo Lumber Co., 661 S.W.2d at 929 (Barrow, J., dissenting). The dissent distinguished Cochran v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 586 S.W.2d 849 (Tex. 1979), which held that
intent in usury cases means intent to make the bargain made, rather than intent to charge a
usurious rate of interest. Cochran, 586 S.W.2d at 850. Justice Barrow noted that in Cochran,
the note was usurious on its face, thus obviating the need to go behind the face of the documents to prove usury. Alamo Lumber Co., 661 S.W.2d at 929 (citing Walker v. Temple Trust
Co., 124 Tex. 575, 577-78, 80 S.W.2d 935, 936 (1935)).
31. Alamo Lumber Co., 661 S.W.2d at 930 (Barrow, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 931 (Barrow, J., dissenting).
33. Id. (Barrow, J., dissenting) (citing Vee Bee Serv. Co. v. Household Fin. Corp., 51
N.Y.S.2d 590, 602 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1944), aff'd, 55 N.Y.S.2d 570 (N.Y. 1945)). See infra notes
37-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of independent consideration.
34. Alamo Lumber Co., 661 S.W.2d at 931 (Barrow, J., dissenting).
35. Id. (Barrow, J., dissenting). The court cited Greever v. Persky, which held that a
lender may charge a separate fee for any distinctly separate and additional consideration other
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D. Distinguishingthe Rule in Alamo Lumber from Other
Situations
In a variety of situations, a lender may require one party to assume,
co-make, guarantee or secure the debts of a second party, in order to
induce the lender to extend credit to the second party. If the party
required to co-make, assume, guarantee or secure such indebtedness is
not itself receiving an extension of credit from the lender, then there is
no underlying loan transaction upon which the co-making, assumption, guarantee or security could constitute usurious "interest." Assume, however, that the party providing the additional support to the
lender is itself a borrower from the lender, but is not receiving any
new funds or other credit extension from the lender, and is not receiving a renewal, extension or modification of its loan at the time that the
additional support for the second party's loan is provided to the
lender. In such a case, Alamo Lumber would not apply because a critical factor in determining whether an Alamo Lumber usury violation
has occurred is whether the party providing the additional support is
required to do so as a condition to receiving a new loan or other credit
extension from the lender.
In addition, a lender does not violate the principle enunciated in
Alamo Lumber if a lender, as a condition to making a loan, or renewing, extending or modifying an existing loan, requires a borrower
to pay, assume, guarantee or provide additional collateral for the borrower's own debts. The Texas Supreme Court in Alamo Lumber specifically excluded such transactions from the general rule.36
Therefore, a lender may require that a borrower, as a condition to the
extension of a new loan or a renewal of an existing loan, provide additional collateral for the borrower's own indebtedness to the lender.
As previously stated, a lender may, without violating the principles
of Alamo Lumber, require that a third party execute a guaranty with
respect to a loan. In some situations, a lender may simultaneously
make separate loans to related borrowers. For example, a lender may
make simultaneous loans to commonly controlled corporations. If the
lender were making a loan to just one of the corporations, then the
than the simple lending of money. Greever v. Persky, 140 Tex. 64, 68, 165 S.W.2d 709, 712
(1942). See infra notes 53-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of how Texas courts

analyze separate charges and fees.
36. Alamo Lumber Co., 661 S.W.2d at 928; see also In re Casbeer, 793 F.2d 1436, 1446-47

(5th Cir. 1986).
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lender would have required that, as part of its credit analysis, the
other corporation guarantee or collateralize the loan to the borrowing
corporation. In the case of simultaneous loans, the lender may require
that each corporation cross-guarantee or cross-collateralize the other
corporation's loan. The borrowers in such a situation may be able to
show that the transaction on its face is a violation of the rule in Alamo
Lumber, because it will appear as though the lender required each
borrower, as a condition to receiving a loan, to guarantee or collateralize the other borrower's loan.
Since the loans, when viewed independently, should not be usurious, the simultaneous cross-guarantees or cross-collateralizations also
should not be usurious. The lender in such a situation should make it
clear in the documentation that its credit policies required the guaranties for each borrower. Some lenders in this situation may be reluctant
to close the loans simultaneously and will delay the closing of a second loan to avoid the appearance of an Alamo Lumber situation.
III.

A.

PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN APPLYING ALAMO LUMBER

Independent Consideration
1. Generally

In many cases, the determination of whether an assumption of indebtedness is interest may depend upon the court's willingness to consider whether the borrower received independent consideration for his
assumption of the third party debt. Unfortunately, whether a Texas
court would consider independent consideration to be a part of the
Alamo Lumber test, or at least an exception to the general rule stated
therein, is subject to question. The dissent in Alamo Lumber placed a
great deal of emphasis on independent consideration while the majority did not discuss this aspect of the test in Alamo Lumber. One might
assume that the dissent discussed independent consideration with the
majority and that the majority rejected it. The majority, however,
may have concluded that there was no independent consideration
from Alamo Lumber to Mrs. Gold and, therefore, chose not to discuss independent consideration.37
To demonstrate the importance of independent consideration, con37. The dissent argued that the Company gave independent consideration to Mrs. Gold
by allowing her to avoid the Bank's foreclosure sale of the property. Alamo Lumber Co., 661
S.W.2d at 932 (Barrow, J., dissenting). Justice Barrow stated that the agreement to forbear
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sider the following example of a fairly typical transaction. Some time
ago Lender made a loan to Developer, evidenced by a promissory
note in the amount of $2,000,000 and secured by real property in
Texas. Developer intended to build a strip shopping center, but was
unable to obtain construction financing due to his inability to prelease sufficient square footage prior to construction. Developer is in
eminent danger of defaulting on the loan from Lender and has been
actively marketing the property. Investor is willing to purchase the
property from Developer, and Lender, after determining that Investor
is a good credit risk, is willing to allow Investor to assume the existing
note and extend the maturity date thereof. This simple set of facts
would not present an Alamo Lumber problem since Lender is not requiring Investor to assume Developer's debt as a condition precedent
to a new loan to Investor.
Now assume that Investor needs additional funds to hold and develop the property and Lender is willing to make a new loan of
$300,000 for such purposes. Investor could now argue that Lender, as
a condition to making the new loan of $300,000, required Investor to
assume the $2,000,000 debt of Developer. As a result, Investor would
argue: (i) the $2,000,000 old loan was interest on the $300,000 new
loan; (ii) Lender has contracted for more than twice the amount of
interest allowed by applicable law; and (iii) the statutory penalties include forfeiture of the $300,000 principal amount of the new loan and
three times the amount of usurious interest contracted for by the
parties.38
The facts and potential result seem exaggerated and harsh, yet they
are not that dissimilar from those in Alamo Lumber. The difference is
that under these facts, Investor has received independent consideration for his assumption of Developer's debt to Lender, by receiving a
conveyance of the property. In addition, Lender consented to the conveyance of the property to Investor, which consent Lender could
have, in most cases, withheld. If Developer conveyed the property to
Investor without Lender's consent, then Lender typically could accelerate the debt and pursue its remedies against Developer and the
property. Finally, although it is not consideration running directly to
Investor, Lender will have given consideration by releasing Developer

from foreclosing is good consideration and that the consideration need not flow between the
contracting parties as long as there is a benefit and detriment on both sides. Id.
38. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06(l),(2) (Vernon 1987).
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from liability under the note. 9
If the evaluation of additional "interest" is tied either to the benefit
received by the Lender or the detriment accepted by Investor as a
result of the assumption, then other facts may become relevant. For
example, if Lender can clearly demonstrate that the value of the property exceeds the amount of the indebtedness assumed, then (arguably)
Lender has not received a direct economic benefit from the assumption. Investor (while required to undertake personal liability on the
debt assumed) will not suffer direct economic loss as a result of assuming, or even paying, the debt that burdens Investor's property.
Under these facts, there should be no usury violation; however, the
case law in Texas on independent consideration is unclear.
2.

Case Law on Independent Consideration

No Texas court has explicitly rejected an independent consideration exception to the Alamo Lumber rule. In Laid Rite, the Fort
Worth Court of Appeals stated the rule that the assumption of the
third party's debt must be a condition of a loan and considerationfor
making it.' One can read the court's requirement that the assumption of the indebtedness must be "consideration for making" the loan
as an indication that there is an independent consideration exception
to the general rule. That is, if the assumption was in consideration of
something other than the loan, then the assumed debt is not considered to be interest. 4 '
In the only other Texas case to discuss independent consideration
in the context of an assumption of indebtedness, Main Bank of Houston required Shearn Moody, as a condition to maintaining Moody's
39. Cf Harrison v. Arrendale, 147 S.E.2d 356, 360 (Ga. Ct. App. 1966). A more appealing, yet less formal, argument is that the substance of this transaction is that Lender is making
a new loan to Investor of $2,300,000, the proceeds of which are used by Investor to purchase
and hold the property. The only reason that Investor is assuming the promissory note executed
by Developer is so that Lender can continue its liens in the property created several years ago,
maintaining lien priority over potential intervening lienholders.
40. Laid Rite, Inc. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 512 S.W.2d 384, 389 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1974, no writ). The court stated that:
There are many cases that hold that where a lender, as a condition of a loan and as a
considerationfor making it, requires the borrower to assume or pay in whole or in part,
the debt that another owes to this same lender; that the amount of the assumed or paid-off
debt will be considered as interest in determining whether or not a loan is usurious. Id.
(emphasis added) (citations omitted).
41. See Note, Usury: Texas Courts Take Interest[;] Alamo Lumber v. Gold, 36 BAYLOR
L. REV. 919, 938-39 (1984).
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clearinghouse relationship with Main Bank, to guarantee payment of
a judgment Main Bank had against Moody's cousin.4 2 The trial court
instructed the jury that:
Where a lender, as a condition of a loan and as consideration for making it, requires the borrower to assume or pay in whole or in part the
debt that another owes to this same lender, the amount of the assumed
or paid-off debt is considered as interest unless the borrower also receives
considerationfor such action.4 3
The court of appeals affirmed the jury's finding in favor of Main
Bank, stating that Main Bank, in relinquishing its right to terminate
the clearinghouse arrangement, gave valuable consideration in exchange for Moody's guaranty of the third party debt."
The courts in Laid Rite, Stephens and Alamo Lumber each cited
several cases in other states in holding that the assumption of indebtedness as a condition to a new loan may be interest. In many of these
cases, the court included an independent consideration exception to
the general rule. For example, a New York Supreme Court stated that
Where a borrower is required, as a condition of the loan, to assume or
pay, in whole or in part, the debt of another, in addition to legal interest, the transaction is usurious, unless the borrower receives something
of benefit for the additional assumption or payment, aside from the use
of the money loaned.4 5
In addition, the New Jersey Superior Court stated that "the exacted
assumption of another's debt makes the loan to a new borrower usurious unless the exaction is supported by consideration other than the
money newly loaned.""
In addition to these cases, other cases in other states have recognized independent consideration as part of the test of whether an assumption of indebtedness was usurious. In Harrison v. Arrendale,4 7
the court held that the release of the original obligor from liability
under the assumed indebtedness constituted additional consideration
42. Moody v. Main Bank of Houston, 667 S.W.2d 613, 615-616 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
43. Id. at 618 (emphasis added). The court did not discuss the apparent dichotomy between the majority and the dissent in Alamo Lumber.
44. Id.at 618-19.
45. Vee Bee Serv. Co. v. Household Fin. Corp., 51 N.Y.S.2d 590, 602 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1944) (citations omitted), aff'd, 55 N.Y.S.2d 570 (N.Y. 1945).
46. Ferdon v. Zarriello Bros., Inc., 208 A.2d 186, 189 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1965).
47. 147 S.E.2d 356 (Ga. Ct. App. 1966).
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to the borrower.4 The court stated that if there is good and valuable
consideration beyond the mere use of money not interposed as a devise to exact usurious interest, then any excess paid or charged is not
usurious.4 9 In McCullough v. Snow, 0 the court stated that:
Where the evidence discloses that a borrower is required to guarantee a
loan to a third person in order to get a loan himself or get his loan
renewed or extended, this is usurious unless, because of the facts surrounding the transaction, there is some intimate business connection as
distinguished from kinship, between the loan being renewed and extended and the indebtedness being assumed, and a present consideration
as well as absence of intention to exact a usurious return. 51

The court in McCullough examined case law in several states in deter52
mining the above stated rule.
3. Additional Authorities
There are many cases in Texas involving separate charges or fees a
lender imposes on its borrowers where the courts have included independent consideration as part of the test of whether such charge is
interest. The traditional rule in Texas as stated in Greever v. Persky is
that "a lender may, without violating the usury law, make an extra
charge for any distinctly separate and additional consideration other
than the simple lending of the money." 53 Under this rule, Texas
courts have held that a variety of charges imposed by a lender on a
borrower are not interest because there was separate consideration for
such charges.5 4 For example, a bona fide commitment fee is not inter48. Id. at 360.
49. Id.
50. 432 P.2d 811 (N.M. 1967).

51. Id. at 815. There are cases which hold that the assumption of indebtedness, by itself,
is usurious. See generally Annotation, Usury: Effect of Borrower'sAgreement to Pay, Guarantee, or Secure Some Other Debt Owed to or by Lender, 31 A.L.R.3d 763, 785-90 (1970). There
are also cases where the court, as in McCullough, required that additional factors, such as
usurious intent, insolvency of the third party obligor, or the distressed financial position of the
borrower, are relevant in determining whether the assumption requirement was usurious. Id.
at 790-807.
52. McCullough, 432 P.2d at 815.
53. Greever v. Persky, 165 S.W.2d 709, 712 (Tex. 1942) (citing Nevels v. Harris, 129 Tex.
190, 196, 102 S.W.2d 1046, 1049 (Tex. 1937)).
54. For a summary of cases holding that separate charges or fees were not interest see
Texas Commerce Bank - Arlington v. Goldring, 665 S.W.2d 103, 104-06 (Tex. 1984) (Spears,
J., concurring).
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est." Also, a lender's charge for a third party inspection of the collateral for the loan is not interest.56
This line of cases is substantial support for the proposition that the
requirement of an assumption of indebtedness in an Alamo Lumber
situation is not interest if there is independent consideration for the
assumption. In Goldring, the Texas Supreme Court held that a requirement that the borrower reimburse the lender for attorneys' fees
rendered in connection with the loan was not usurious.- In dissent,
Justice Robertson stated that the holding in Goldring was inconsistent
with the holding in Alamo Lumber."8 Justice Robertson stated that
the attorneys' fees were the independent debt of the bank and that the
bank required the borrower to assume such indebtedness as a condition precedent to the extension of the underlying loan. 9 Although
Justice Robertson would hold that independent consideration is not
part of the test under both Alamo Lumber and the Greever v. Persky
lines of cases, he acknowledges that there is no difference between
separate charges or fees imposed by the lender and the assumption of
indebtedness.
Therefore, the assumption of indebtedness is no different than a
separate charge made upon the borrower by the lender. If such assumption is in consideration for the extension of a new loan (or renewal of an existing loan), then the amount of the assumed
indebtedness is interest. If, however, there is some independent consideration for the assumption of indebtedness, then such amount is
not interest. In addition, the concept of independent consideration is
consistent with the basic definition of interest under Texas law. That
is, if interest is compensation for the use, forbearance or detention of
money, and if a borrower assumes indebtedness in exchange for some
other consideration, such as a conveyance of property, then the assumption is not interest.
4.

Conclusions About Independent Consideration

The only argument that a Texas court would not recognize in55. Gonzales County Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Freeman, 534 S.W.2d 903, 906 (Tex. 1976);
Stedman v. Georgetown Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 595 S.W.2d 486, 488 (Tex. 1979).
56. Morris v. Miglicco, 468 S.W.2d 517, 519 (Tex. Civ. App.- Houston [14th Dist.]

1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
57. Goldring, 665 S.W.2d at 104.
58. Id. at 106 (Robertson, J., dissenting).
59. Id.
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dependent consideration as an exception to the general rule regarding
the assumption of indebtedness as a condition to making or renewing
a loan is that the Texas Supreme Court in Alamo Lumber did not
discuss independent consideration while the dissent discussed independent consideration in depth. On the other hand, the cases cited
in Laid Rite and Alamo Lumber recognized that the assumption of
indebtedness is not interest if there is separate and distinct consideration for the assumption apart from the loan. In addition, the language
of the test stated by the court in Laid Rite indicates that the assumption must be consideration for the making of the loan in order for the
assumption to be interest. Furthermore, the assumption of indebtedness is no different from a separate charge or fee imposed by the
lender upon the borrower. The traditional rule in Texas is that such
separate charges or fees are not interest if there is separate and distinct consideration for such charge. Finally, although there are some
cases which do not discuss independent consideration in the context
of the assumption of indebtedness, there are no cases that wholly reject independent consideration as being a part of the test for determining whether a transaction is usurious.
5. What is Independent Consideration?
The existence of independent consideration in a particular transaction may be apparent from its facts. For example, in the example previously given, the independent consideration is the conveyance of the
property to the new borrower, as well as the additional consideration
of the lender's release of the original obligor and the consent to the
transfer of the property. In other situations, however, the existence of
independent consideration may depend upon an analysis of the economics of the transaction. For example, consider a situation described
in the introduction of this article, where a lender requires a shareholder to guarantee or secure an obligation of his corporation as a
condition to the making or renewal of a loan to the shareholder. Assuming that the shareholder owns one hundred percent (100%) of the
outstanding stock of the corporation, then the shareholder's payments
to the lender of the corporation's indebtedness may result in a corresponding economic benefit to the shareholder. If the corporation is
solvent, then the value of the corporation, as well as the shareholder's
equity in the corporation, will increase as a result of the repayment of
the existing indebtedness. In addition, the corporation may provide to
the shareholder a note or other evidence of his contribution to the
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corporation by payment of its indebtedness. The conclusion that the
shareholder's payment creates an economic benefit to the shareholder,
however, is diminished if the corporation is insolvent, and remains
insolvent, after the shareholder's payment.
It should also be noted that the decisions by the courts in Laid Rite
and Moody did not explicitly require that the "independent consideration" be equal to, or the equivalent of, the amount of indebtedness
assumed by the borrower. If the independent consideration requirement or exception is adopted by Texas courts, however, then it is possible that the "equivalency" of independent consideration will be
relevant.
B. Different Lenders
A recent Texas case involving the principles discussed in Alamo
Lumber has created some disturbing precedent for lenders in Texas.
As mentioned earlier, the court in Laid Rite was careful to note that
in the cases it had relied upon, the borrower was required to assume
or pay an obligation of a third party to the same lender.' In Victoria
Bank & Trust Co. v. Brady,6 1 the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals
held that in an Alamo Lumber situation, the amount of assumed debt
is interest even if the borrower is required to assume debt owed to a
different lender.62 The Texas Supreme Court has agreed to review the
case and lenders are hoping that the court reverses this aspect of the
holding.
The facts in Victoria are complicated and the decision is some
twenty pages in length.63 Victoria Bank & Trust Co. (Victoria)
agreed to make a loan to a partnership (the Partnership) comprised of
Fancher Cattle Co. (Fancher) and Marlyn Brady (Brady). 61 Instead
of being executed by the Partnership, Brady and Fancher signed the
note as co-makers.65 Victoria required Brady to mortgage his ranch
60. Laid Rite, Inc. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 512 S.W.2d 384, 389 (Tex. Civ. App.-Forth
Worth 1974, no writ). See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
holding in Laid Rite.
61. 779 S.W.2d 893 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989, writ granted).

62. Id. at 901.
63. The case also involves a discussion of the relationship between usury claims and
claims under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act. This aspect of the case is beyond the
scope of this article.
64. Id. at 898. The loan was a line of credit in the amount of $150,000.00. Id. at 899.
65. Id. at 898. Victoria later attempted to alter the note to indicate that it was executed
by the Partnership. Id.
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in Zavala County, which was subject to a prior lien in favor of Winter
Garden Production Credit Association (Winter Garden), as collateral
for the loan.6 6 Victoria required, as a condition to the making of the
loan to Brady and Fancher, that Winter Garden's first lien be paid.6 7
Brady and Fancher executed the note, which stated that it was in
renewal and extension of the loan from Winter Garden.6 8 A separate
loan agreement provided that Victoria was not obligated to advance
funds under the note until Victoria had obtained a first lien in the
Brady ranch.6 9 Victoria subsequently purchased Winter Garden's
note and lien, advancing $121,796.75 of the loan to Fancher and
Brady. 7° Therefore, Fancher and Brady effectively received a new
loan of approximately $28,000. Fancher, on the other hand, received
a new loan of $28,000, but became obligated for $150,000. After renewing the note in 1984, Victoria notified Brady and Fancher that it
would not renew the note when it matured in 1985. 1' Fancher liquidated enough assets to reduce the balance of the note to the amount of
the preexisting indebtedness of Brady to Winter Garden.72
Some time later, in an unrelated transaction, Fancher sold a third
party some cattle and received a draft drawn on Victoria.7 3 When
Fancher attempted to cash the draft, Victoria denied payment until
Fancher agreed to forfeit $40,000 towards the outstanding balance of
the Brady-Fancher note. 74 At the same time, Brady filed suit to enjoin Victoria from foreclosing on the ranch. Subsequently, Brady,
Fancher, and Victoria settled, agreeing to postpone the sale in exchange for a new note and a release of claims.7 6 Brady and Fancher
then defaulted on the renewal note, and Victoria foreclosed its liens
on the ranch and sued Brady and Fancher for the deficiency. 77
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 899. The loan officer had, on several occasions, assured Fancher that he would
never have to pay any of Brady's debts. Id. at 898-99.
69. Id. at 899.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. Victoria continued to assure Fancher that he would not be obligated to pay
Brady's pre-existing debt to Winter Garden. Id. Fancher subseqently paid his other obligations
to Victoria and assumed that his relationship with Victoria had ended. Id.
73. Id. at 900.
74, Id.
75. Id.
76, Id.
77, Id.
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Fancher counterclaimed that the transaction was usurious under
Alamo Lumber and recovered a judgment in excess of $4,500,000.78
Fancher's Alamo Lumber claim is essentially that, as a condition to
the extension of the new line of credit loan, Victoria required Fancher
to assume Brady's indebtedness to Winter Garden.79 Victoria attempted to distinguish Alamo Lumber by arguing that the assumed
indebtedness must be owed to the same lender extending the new
loan.8 ° The court of appeals rejected this argument, stating that the
Supreme Court in Alamo Lumber did not require "identity of
lender."'" In addition, the court rejected Victoria's argument that it
received no benefit from Fancher's assumption of Brady's debt to
Winter Garden stating that benefit to the lender is immaterial.8 2 The
court also rejected Victoria's affirmative defenses based upon the release of claims executed by Fancher and upon a savings clause in the
3
8

loan documents.

The court of appeals arguably did not have to reach its holding that
identity of lender is not a pre-requisite to recovery under an Alamo
Lumber theory. Under the terms of the loan to Brady and Fancher,
Victoria was not obligated to advance new money until Victoria had a
priority lien in Brady's ranch, which would not occur until Victoria
purchased the Winter Garden note. 4 Therefore, as the court pointed
out, Fancher did not become obligated to pay Brady's debt until it
78. Id. at 900-02. The judgment represented statutory penalties under Article 5069-1.06
under the original note and the two renewal notes. Id. at 902.
79. Brady could not argue that the loan was usurious under Alamo Lumber since he was
required to assume an indebtedness he was already obligated to pay. The principles of Alamo
Lumber do not apply to a lender's requirement that the borrower pay or assume his own preexisting indebtedness. Alamo Lumber Co. v. Gold, 661 S.W.2d 926, 928 (Tex. 1984).
80. Victoria, 779 S.W.2d at 901.
81. Id. The court stated that the Texas Supreme Court in Alamo Lumber noted that Laid
Rite and Stephens involved situations in which the debt was owed to the same lender; however,
the Supreme court did not limit its holding in such a manner. Id. This statement by the court
in Victoria appears to be incorrect. The court in Alamo Lumber did not address the issue of
whether the debt the borrower must assume must be to the same lender. The court merely
cited Laid Rite and Stephens, in addition to legal precedents from other states, without comment. Alamo Lumber, 661 S.W.2d at 927-28.
82. Victoria Bank & Trust Co. v. Brady, 779 S.W.2d 893, 901 (Tex. App-Corpus
Christi 1989, writ granted) (citing Danziger v. San Jacinto Say. Ass'n, 732 S.W.2d 300, 304
(Tex. 1987)).
83. Victoria, 779 S.W.2d at 901-02. See infra notes 148-170 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the effect of a savings clause in the lender's loan documentation on an Alamo
Lumber claim.
84. Id. at 901.
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was owed to Victoria.8 5 Fancher, as a result, was required to assume
the obligations of a third party to the same lender. Therefore, one may
argue that the court's analysis of identity of lender is dicta.
In addition, the Texas Supreme Court in Alamo Lumber did not
address the issue of whether the debt assumed or paid by the borrower must be owed to the same lender.8 6 As previously noted, the
court in Laid Rite, in adopting the rule that the assumed debt is interest, was careful to note that all of the cases it relied upon involved
assumption of debt to the same lender.8 7 The new lender in Laid Rite
was a subsidiary of the lender of the assumed indebtedness. 8 As a
result, the court in Laid Rite remanded the case for a determination
of whether the new lender was the alter ego of the original lender.89
Even if the ultimate result in Victoria may be correct, the rule of law
stated therein should be reversed. Victoria is an example of the axiom
that "bad facts" make "bad law." Fancher obligated himself to pay
$150,000 in exchange for a loan of $28,000. In addition, he was continually assured that he would never be liable for Brady's preexisting
debt to Winter Garden. Nevertheless, the holding that the assumed
indebtedness need not be owed to the same lender is dangerous
precedent.
For example, consider the hypothertical described in Section
III.A.l.where Investor agrees to assume Developer's obligations to
Lender pursuant to a purchase of property from Developer. Suppose
that Developer seeks a loan from Insurance Company, rather than
Lender, for $2,300,000, the proceeds of which will be used to
purchase the property and pay costs and expenses. Insurance Company purchases Developer's note from Lender, and Investor assumes
the obligations evidenced thereby. Investor has assumed Developer's
obligations to a different lender than the one extending the new loan.
Investor has not suffered any detriment by assuming such debt, and
Insurance Company has not exacted compensation greater than it
would have received had it just loaned $2,300,000 directly to Investor,

85. Id.

86. See supra note 81.
87. Laid Rite, Inc. v. Texas Indus. Inc., 512 S.W.2d 384, 389 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1974, no writ). See notes 25-26 and accompanying text for a discussion of the holding in
Laid Rite.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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without the requirement of the assumption of Developer's debt to
Lender.
In addition, consider a situation where a borrower owns property
that he purchased subject to a preexisting debt and lien in favor of a
mortgage company. The borrower never assumed the preexisting indebtedness; therefore, he is not personally obligated to pay such indebtedness. The borrower, while negotiating a renewal of an existing
loan to a different lender, attempts to refinance the obligations encumbering the property with this lender, and the second lender requires
the borrower to assume, and therefore become personally obligated to
pay, the preexisting obligations to the first lender. The borrower may
argue, citing Victoria, that as a condition to the renewal of his loan
from the second lender, the second lender required him to assume the
preexisting indebtedness to the first lender.
The facts in these examples, although not nearly as egregious as
those in Victoria, are closely aligned with Fancher's assumption of
Brady's debt to Victoria. In the first example, a key distinguishing fact
from Victoria is, again, that Investor will receive independent consideration for his assumption of Developer's debt, i.e., a conveyance of
the property. Therefore, if the Texas Supreme Court affirms the holding in Victoria, the independent consideration exception to the general
rule in Alamo Lumber would become more important to lenders in
Texas. In the second example, however, the borrower is not receiving
any independent consideration for his assumption of the preexisting
indebtedness to the first lender. The borrower is, by becoming personally obligated to pay such indebtedness, suffering a detriment.9 0 On
the other hand, the second lender is advancing new money but not
receiving any additional compensation other than an otherwise proper
stated rate of interest, for the use, forbearance, or detention of its
money. Would the court in Victoria hold that usury occurred under
these facts? The answer is unclear.
C.

The "Debt of Another" Requirement

Among the limitations of the Alamo Lumber holding is the requirement that the loan is conditioned on the borrower assuming the debt
90. One may argue that the borrower's property was encumbered by the indebtedness
before and after borrower's assumption of the indebtedness. As a result, the transfer from nonrecourse to recourse liability is not a significant detriment to the borrower. The assumption
does, however, result in the bank having recourse against the borrower's other assets.
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of a third party as opposed to one of the borrower's own debts. 9' For
example, if a lender, as a condition to an extension of credit, requires
a borrower to assume an obligation that he has previously guaranteed
or that he is liable for as a partner of the obligor, then the borrower
has, in effect, assumed his own obligations or debt. As a result, the
third party debt requirement raises issues regarding partnership and
agency law, community property law, and limitations on full recourse
liability.
In Sunbelt Service Corp. v. Vandenburg,92 the El Paso Court of Appeals addressed each of the foregoing issues in the Alamo Lumber
context. In 1983, Mr. Vandenburg was involved in acquiring apartment complexes in El Paso, Texas. 93 He owned all the stock in
Wayne A. Vandenburg Enterprises, Inc., which, together with Mr.
Vandenburg, comprised the two general partners of the Excelsior II
limited partnership. 94 Excelsior II purchased the Alto Mesa Apartments, executing a promissory note in the amount of $2,400,000 payable to Sunbelt Service Corporation (Sunbelt).95
Excelsior II and an additional general partner, formed another limited partnership known as Excelsior 111.96 Excelsior III acquired the
Sandpiper Apartments in El Paso, executing an additional promissory
note in favor of Sunbelt in the amount of $2,800,000. 9' The two partnership promissory notes were essentially nonrecourse in nature, limiting the liability of the maker to the extent of the lien security against
the respective properties and prohibiting the recovery of any deficiency judgment in case of foreclosure. 98
When the apartment business in El Paso declined, Excelsior II and
Excelsior III became delinquent on their note payments.9 9 During
the course of negotiations, the parties decided that foreclosure on the
partnership properties could be avoided by Mr. Vandenburg and his
wife personally executing a $200,000 note to Sunbelt, with the pro-

91. Alamo Lumber Co. v. Gold, 661 S.W.2d 926, 928 (Tex. 1984).
92. 774 S.W.2d 815 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1989, writ denied).

93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 816.
Id.
Id.
Id.

97. Id.

98. Id.
99. Id.

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol22/iss4/2

22

Wright et al.: Alamo Lumber and Texas Usury Law: Playing with Fire in the Usury

1991]

USUR Y

ceeds of the note to be applied to the delinquent partnership notes. I° °
Thereafter, the payments on the partnership notes were twice renewed
and extended, and Sunbelt also renewed and extended the $200,000
Vandenburg note.101 Further failures to pay the note obligations resulted in a settlement in which Sunbelt received title to the partnership properties in lieu of foreclosure.1"2 Additionally, an agreement
was entered in which the Vandenburgs reacknowledged their personal
liability under the $200,000 note.103 Ultimately, when Sunbelt
brought suit for collection of the $200,000 note, the Vandenburgs
counterclaimed for usury, relying on Alamo Lumber."o
In essence, the Vandenburgs contended that because: (i) the Excelsior debts were nonrecourse debts; (ii) Mr. Vandenburg, as a general
partner of the Excelsior partnerships, had no personal liability under
the partnership notes; and (iii) Mrs. Vandenburg was not even a partner of the partnerships, those notes did not constitute debts of Mr.
Vandenburg or his wife under an Alamo Lumber analysis.105 The
trial court agreed with the Vandenburgs, granting summary judgment
on the usury counterclaim against Sunbelt. 1°6
The El Paso Court of Appeals reversed the summary judgment and
rendered judgment in favor of Sunbelt which had sought summary
judgment, holding that there was no usury in the transaction as a
matter of law.' 0 7 In reversing the trial court, the court of appeals held
that the Excelsior notes were the debts of Mr. Vandenburg by virtue
of his status as a general partner of the partnerships, notwithstanding
that the partnership notes were nonrecourse in character.10 8 The
court observed that a general partner of a limited partnership incurs a
debt to the same extent as does the partnership, even though the debt
may be nonrecourse in nature.1 °9 The court further held that the
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 817.
103. Id.

104. Id. The essence of the usury claim was that the entire principal balance of the
$200,000 personal loan constituted interest because it was applied to the nonrecourse partnership debts.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 816.
107. Id.at 818.
108. Id. at 817.
109. Id. (citing Rohdie v. Washington, 641 S.W.2d 317 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1982, writ
ref'd n.r.e.)).
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partnership notes were likewise the debts of Mrs. Vandenburg under
community property law principles, including the presumption that
"debts contracted during marriage are presumed to be on the credit of
the community." 110 As a result, the court found that the partnership
debts were the personal debts of both of the Vandenburgs.11
The court rejected the argument that, because the partnership liabilities were nonrecourse and the Vandenburgs had no personal liability in case of default, the partnership debts were not debts of the
Vandenburgs under Alamo Lumber. 1 2 Central to the court's analysis
was the fact that, notwithstanding the nonrecourse nature of the
notes, the general partnerships and their general partners "became
obligated for the payment of money" upon execution of the promissory notes. 113 Similarly, liens were placed on partnership real estate
by the creditor as collateral security for repayment of the notes."I4
Since debts were created and encumbrances of the real property existed, such debts necessarily implied a creditor-debtor relationship."'
As the court noted, "had the money been paid as agreed by those who
owed it, the liens would have been released without" foreclosing upon
the collateral. 116 Therefore, the court held that any newly required
obligation by the Vandenburgs to be applied to the partnership debts
would not be a third party debt for purposes of Alamo Lumber and
the interest computation under the loans." 7
At least one other Texas court has considered the issue of nonrecourse language contained in promissory notes, holding that the presence of such language in a note does not mean that the maker has no
liability thereunder. In Le Boeuf v. Davis,"IIthe court considered the
contention of the appellants, the makers of a promissory note, that
nonrecourse language contained in a promissory note relieved them
from any liability thereunder. Rejecting this argument, the court held:
We do not construe the provision quoted in the note as meaning the
110. Sunbelt Serv. Corp. v. Vandenburg, 774 S.W.2d 815, 817 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1989,
writ denied) (relying on Cockerham v. Cockerham, 527 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. 1975)).
111. Sunbelt, 774 S.W.2d at 817.

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

117. Id.

118. 306 S.W.2d 185 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1957, no writ).
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appellants were not liable in any manner upon the note sued upon but it
could mean nothing more than that if after judgment and the foreclosure if the property did not bring as much as the note specified then
appellants would not be responsible for any deficiency.
[T]he fact that there was a provision in the note and deed of trust, that
the appellants would not be responsible for any deficiency, would not
relieve them from being responsible upon the note.
[T]he fact that the property might not sell under forced sale for as much
as the face of the note in question would not relieve the appellants from
upon the note to the extent of whatever the property might
being liable
9
bring."

Thus, as the court properly held in Sunbelt Service, the presence or
absence of full recourse personal liability is irrelevant to the existence
of a debt under Alamo Lumber. As a result, a borrower, whose property is encumbered as security for a nonrecourse obligation, and who
is required to pay all or part of the nonrecourse obligation as a condition of an extension of credit, apparently does not have a claim that
the extension of credit was usurious under Alamo Lumber.
IV.

APPLICATION OF ALAMO LUMBER TO CONTINGENT
LIABILITIES

A.

Are Guarantiesand CollateralPledges "Assumptions"?
1. Overview

By its terms, the Alamo Lumber holding protects only a borrower
who "assumes" a third party's debt to a lender as a condition to that
lender's making a loan to the borrower. 20 No Texas court has ever
held that a borrower who is required to execute a guaranty or collateral pledge to support the "debt of another" as a condition of a loan
may maintain an Alamo Lumber usury claim. It is nonetheless useful
to review the possible application of Alamo Lumber to such contingent liabilities, as those types of liabilities present a recurring problem
119. Id. at 187. See also Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. University Anclote, Inc., 764 F.2d

804, 806 (1 1th Cir. 1985) (stating that merely because the borrower "cannot be held liable for a
deficiency judgment does not mean that" the borrower "did not incur an indebtedness when it
signed the note").
120. Alamo Lumber Co. v. Gold, 661 S.W.2d 926, 928 (Tex. 1984).
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in loan restructuring or workout activities involving related borrowing entities. Under existing Texas law, it would appear that a borrower required to guarantee or pledge collateral to support the debts
of third parties could be entitled to the protection of Alamo Lumber,
although difficult valuation and evidentiary issues are raised by the
analysis.
Under the Texas usury statutes, "any person who contracts for,
charges or receives interest which is greater than the amount allowed
by" law is required to forfeit to the "obligor" the statutory penalties.' 2 ' Thus, in order to be entitled to invoke the protections of the
usury statutes, a party must be an "obligor" under the law.
An "obligor" under article 5069-1.06 has been defined as a "person
who pays, is charged or has contracted to pay interest at a rate in
excess of that allowed by law."' 22 Furthermore, Texas courts have
held that "one who is not by law a maker of a note is not an obligor
thereon though as an absolute guarantor he is liable for payment
' 23
under the guaranty contract."'
Texas law clearly sets forth the legal requirements for assumption
of a debt. In essence, a party who assumes a debt becomes "primarily" liable for payment of the debt.' 24 As a result, it would appear
that a party who "assumes" the debt of another must be or become, as
a matter of law, primarily obligated for the payment of that debt.
Nonetheless, even though such an "assumption" is a necessary condition to Alamo Lumber liability, it may not be, as will be seen,
sufficient.
2. Guaranties of Payment and Collection
The party who executes an absolute and unconditional guaranty
(i.e., waiving presentment, notice of dishonor, protest, and all demands upon the maker or drawee of the debt guaranteed) may be
considered, under some circumstances, primarily liable under that
guaranty. As a result, a primarily liable party waives its right to require the holder of the guaranteed note to pursue action against the
121. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06 (1987); id. at art. 5069-8.01, 8.02.
122. Patterson v. Neel, 610 S.W.2d 154, 156 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
123. Id. (citing Hartnett v. Adams & Holmes Mortgage Co., 539 S.W.2d 181, 183 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, no writ).
124. Chapman v. Crichet, 95 S.W.2d 360, 364 (Tex. 1936); Brooks v. Erbar, 186 S.W.2d
372, 377 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1945, writ ref'd w.o.m.).
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maker before the guarantor becomes primarily liable. 2 Although
guaranties are technically secondary liabilities, 2 6 the Texas Supreme
Court has held that a guaranty of payment of a debt constitutes a
primary rather than secondary obligation of the guarantor.1 27 Conversely, a "guaranty of collection" is typically an undertaking of the
guarantor to pay if the debt cannot be collected by the use of reasonable diligence. A party executing a guaranty of collection is certainly
not primarily liable for payment of the debt. Indeed, the principal
debtor may be required to be joined as a party in any action seeking
28
collection under such a guaranty.
Guaranties of payment rather than collection are probably more
common in current commercial transactions. As a result, a strict
reading of the Alamo Lumber requirement that a borrower "assume"
the debt of a third party could arguably be satisfied by the execution
of an absolute and unconditional guaranty of payment, while a guaranty of collection would clearly fall outside the Alamo Lumber
holding.
3.

Other Collateral Pledges

As with guaranties, no Texas court has ever held that a collateral
pledge of real or personal property constitutes the "assumption" of a
debt for Alamo Lumber purposes. However, collateral pledges, such
as deeds of trust covering real property and the wide variety of security agreements covering personal property, should be evaluated for
Alamo Lumber purposes by the "primary" versus "secondary" obligation analysis set forth above. For example, a deed of trust covering
real property could require that the beneficiary of the deed of trust
attempt to exhaust other remedies against the maker of the debt
before proceeding with foreclosure. The character of these types of
transactions, however, is subject to contactual variation on a case-by-

125. Hopkins v. First Nat'l Bank at Brownsville, 551 S.W.2d 343, 345 (Tex. 1977) (citing
Universal Metals & Mach., Inc. v. Bohart, 539 S.W.2d 874, 877 (Tex. 1976) (in which the
guaranty expressly described the guarantors as "primary obligors").
126. A. STEARNS, THE LAW OF SURETYSHIP § 4. 1 (5th ed. 1951). "Since the contract of
guaranty is collateral, a primary or principal obligation must exist to which it is secondary, as
without a principal debt there can be no guaranty." Id. at 59.
127. See supra note 125.
128. Ford v. Darwin, 767 S.W.2d 851, 854 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied); Wolfe
v. Schuster, 591 S.W.2d 926, 930 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, no writ); TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 17.001 (Vernon 1986).
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case basis. Accordingly, there are no broad generalizations regarding
real or personal property pledges. Borrowers may nevertheless assert
that a requirement of a collateral pledge is no different from an "assumption" of debt. However, because a collateral pledgor does not
become personally liable to pay the debt, as in the case of a guaranty,
the collateral pledge is conceptually distinct from the guaranty under
Alamo Lumber.1 29 Therefore, even if a collateral pledge falls within
the ambit of Alamo Lumber, the extra "interest" would be based upon
the value of the collateral pledged, rather than the amount of indebtedness secured by the pledge.
4.

Circumstances in Which Alamo Lumber Might be Applicable
to Contingent or Secondary Liabilities

As previously noted, the question whether a guaranty or collateral
pledge is characterized as an "assumption" of debt for Alamo Lumber
purposes is dependent, at least in part, on the specific language of the
instruments at issue. Notwithstanding the fact that language in a
guaranty, deed of trust or similar security agreement might militate in
favor of its categorization as a secondary rather than a primary obligation, other factual circumstances may be relevant in the
determination.
For instance, a lender might require, as a condition of renewing or
extending a loan to a borrower, that such borrower guaranty or execute a collateral pledge to support the loan obligations of a third party
who lacks the financial ability to pay his loans. Under such circumstances, it could be argued that, by virtue of the poor financial condition of the borrower, the contingent nature of the guaranty or
collateral pledge is merely illusory, since it is highly likely that the
guaranty or collateral pledge will be called. As a result, the guarantor
or pledgor can argue that undertaking even a "secondary" obligation
in support of the renewal or extension of the debt of a destitute borrower effectively constitutes "assumption" of third party debt. To
date, no Texas court has addressed this issue.
B.

Valuation and Enforcement of Contingent Obligations
Whether and how Alamo Lumber can be applied to contingent or

129. But see Planters' & Mechanics' Nat'l Bank v. Robertson, 86 S.W. 643, 645 (Tex.
Civ. App.-1905, no writ) (a party securing the debt of another with a mortgage of real property becomes a surety or guarantor of that debt to the extent of the interest in the land).
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secondary obligations is potentially dependent on difficult legal and
factual analyses, which have thus far not been undertaken by any
Texas court. Two obvious areas of inquiry are valuation and enforcement of contingent or secondary obligations. The valuation analysis is
informed to some extent by existing Texas usury law, while a review
of enforcement issues relies to a lesser degree on present Texas law.
1. Valuation: The Contingent or Speculative Benefit
If a judicial determination is made that a guaranty or other collateral pledge constitutes an "assumption" of a third party debt under an
Alamo Lumber analysis, it then becomes necessary to determine the
precise value 130 of the "assumption" in order to determine the amount
of interest contracted for, charged or received. Obviously, even if a
guaranty or other collateral pledge is deemed "interest" under Alamo
Lumber, no usury violation occurs unless the interest exceeds the
maximum lawful rate.
Texas courts in Beavers v. Taylor and Pansy Oil Co. v. Federal Oil
Co. have held a loan not usurious where the borrower's obligation to
pay a certain amount is dependent upon a contingency. 131 Moreover,
"a contract is not usurious where the lender is to receive uncertain
value,.., even though the probable value" may exceed the amount of
32
lawful interest.
A second line of Texas cases has recently been cited by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit as conflicting with the
Beavers line of cases. In Najarro v. Sasi International,Ltd." 33 the
Fifth Circuit held that promissory notes providing for the payment of
130. The term "value" could be defined in a number of ways for purposes of usury analysis. For instance, value could mean the detriment incurred by the guarantor or pledgor of
collateral. Conversely, it could be defined as the benefit received by the lender from the borrower, which would seem to be more consistent with the language and purposes of the Texas
usury laws. See Goodman v. Seely, 243 S.W.2d 858, 859 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1951,
writ ref'd) (payment by non-borrower to induce lender to make loan to borrower is not interest). For purposes of this article, concepts of "value" and "valuing" are used as a shorthand
summary of the economic analysis relevant to the applicable legal principles.
131. Beavers v. Taylor, 434 S.W.2d 230, 231 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1968, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Pansy Oil Co. v. Federal Oil Co., 91 S.W.2d 453, 457 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1936, writ ref'd).
132. Beavers, 434 S.W.2d at 231; Ragland v. Short, 245 S.W.2d 368, 370 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1951, mand. overruled); Korth v. Tumlinson, 73 S.W.2d 1048, 1050 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1934, no writ); Burton v. Stayner, 182 S.W. 394, 395 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1916, writ ref'd).
133. 904 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir. 1990).
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a "commission" of twenty-five percent, apparently due and payable
only in the event of a profit in the underlying transaction, were usurious as a matter of Texas law. 34 Relying on a line of cases holding
that "a contract is usurious as a matter of law if there is any contingency by which the lender may receive more than the lawful rate of
interest,"' 3 1 the court purported to distinguish the Beavers line of
cases. 136
As noted by the Texas Supreme Court in Smart v. Tower Land &

Inv. Co.:
The contract under construction will not be found usurious on its face
unless it expressly entitles the lender, upon the happening of a contingency or37otherwise, to exact interest at a rate greater than that allowed
by law.'

The purported conflict appears to be illusory. The Smart rule is, as
the Fifth Circuit admitted in Najarro, easily distinguishable from the
holdings of the Beavers and Pansy Oil cases.' 38 Where, as in Beavers
and Pansy Oil, the amount to be paid for the use of the lender's money
is uncertain under the terms of the contract at issue, the contract does
not expressly entitle the lender to exact interest at a rate greater than
that allowed by law and, as a result, there is no usury even though the
amount received by the lender may exceed lawful interest. 3 9
A guarantor or collateral pledgor seeking to rely on Alamo Lumber
to avoid a debt would be likely to characterize the entire amount of
the guaranty or value of collateral pledged as the "assumed" debt. On
the other hand, a lender attempting to avoid Alamo Lumber difficulties could argue that the guaranty or collateral pledge does not constitute "interest" at all unless funds are actually realized under such
instruments. This is particularly the case where the loan documents
contain usury savings clauses."

134. Id. at 1009.
135. Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Schuenemann, 668 S.W.2d 324, 328 (Tex. 1984); Dixon
v. Brooks, 604 S.W.2d 330, 334 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
136. Najarro, 904 F.2d at 1009; Dixon v. Brooks, 678 S.W.2d 728, 729 (Tex. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Smart v. Tower Land & Inv. Co., 597 S.W.2d
333, 341 (Tex. 1980).
137. Smart, 597 S.W.2d at 341 (emphasis added) (citing W.E. Grace Mfg. Co. v. Levin,
506 S.W.2d 580, 584 (Tex. 1974)).
138. Najarro,904 F.2d at 1010.
139. Beavers, 434 S.W.2d at 231.
140. See infra notes 148-170 and accompanying text for a discussion of saving clauses.
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2. Valuation: Timing Issues
The application of the above legal principles to the evaluation of
contingent obligations raises several questions. First, it must be determined when the valuation of the contingent obligation is to be made.
If the value of a guaranty or collateral pledge is to be determined at
the inception of the lending transaction at issue, when the underlying
note has not been paid at all, a relatively high value might be ascribed
to the contingent obligation, because the limit of the guaranty or collateral pledge could be exhausted to satisfy the debt. However, Alamo
Lumber should not apply where a loan to a borrower in strong financial condition is guaranteed or secured by the borrower attempting to
claim usury, because of the remote prospect that the guarantee or collateral pledge will be called on to satisfy the debt. Similarly, a borrower guarantying a debt secured in its entirety by other liquid
collateral should not be able to claim successfully that the guaranty is
interest under Alamo Lumber.
On the other hand, if the value of the contingent obligation is determined at the time a lender has undertaken collection efforts and is
deemed to have "charged" or "received" interest, the value of that
obligation could be greatly reduced, if for no other reason than the
fact that the underlying debt may have been reduced over time before
attempts to realize on the contingent obligations are made by the
lender. Conversely, the value of the obligation may be larger, at the
time of the "charging" or "receipt" of interest, if the borrower's financial condition has deteriorated since the inception of the loan and the
lender is forced to seek full recovery from the guarantor or collateral
pledgor. In either case, under such circumstances, the lender might
be able to rely on independent consideration' 4 ' or "spreading" of interest142 to avoid usury. Plainly, a number of complex and interrelated
variables must be comprehensively addressed by any judicial tribunal
attempting to value contingent obligations for Alamo Lumber purposes. The analysis is far from simple and obvious.
The problem of valuing contingent obligations at the inception of
the loan transaction is complicated further by the presence of contribution, indemnity or subrogation rights that may be available to the
guarantor or collateral pledgor against the maker of the note or
141. See supra notes 37-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of independent
consideration.
142. See infra note 149.
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against co-guarantors. 4 3 Particularly where makers, co-guarantors,
or other pledgors are solvent, the guarantor or pledgor relying on
Alamo Lumber should be required to ascribe a value to subrogation or
contribution rights to reduce the value of the guaranty or pledge characterized as "interest" under Alamo Lumber. This analysis finds support in bankruptcy principles regarding determinations of solvency or
insolvency for preference purposes.'"
In addition, as regards collateral pledges and guaranties, a comparison of the amount of the debt guaranteed or secured to the value of
the contingent obligation itself is appropriate. For example, a borrower pledging a parcel of real property valued at $500,000 as security for a $100,000 note could not seriously argue that the entire value
of the property pledged is "interest" under Alamo Lumber. Likewise,
that same borrower arguably should not be able to rely on Alamo
Lumber at all if the pledged property is never sold or realized on by
the lender.
As noted later in this article, the presence of a savings clause in the
credit documents may dramatically affect the valuation given to a
guaranty or collateral pledge under Alamo Lumber analysis. 45 Because a lender may avoid liability for contracting for or charging usurious interest by virtue of a savings clause under existing law, and
because receipt of usurious interest may likewise be covered by a savings clause, the determination of when and how to value contingent
obligations for purposes of Alamo Lumber usury analysis becomes
quite problematic. To date, the courts have provided no meaningful
guidance in this area. Indeed, given the inherently uncertain nature of
when and how contingent obligations may be realized to satisfy debts,
143. Under Texas law, a surety who pays indebtedness of the principal may bring an
action for reimbursement by the principal. Highlands Cable Television, Inc. v. Wong, 547
S.W.2d 324, 327 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Scale v. Hudgens, 538
S.W.2d 459, 460 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, writ dism'd); Fulton v. Edge, 435
S.W.2d 263, 265 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The general rule of contribution allows a guarantor who has paid more than his proportionate share of the obligation
guaranteed to obtain contribution from co-guarantors to equalize their liability. See Miller v.
Miles, 400 S.W.2d 4, 7 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
144. 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
101.31[6] (15th ed. 1980) (guaranty should be included in total indebtedness but appropriate allowances could be made under asset column for
possible rights of subrogation and contribution); see In re Ollag Constr. Equip. Corp., 57 F.2d
904 (2d Cir. 1978); Wingert v. President Directors & Co. of Hagerstown Bank, 41 F.2d 660
(4th Cir. 1930).
145. See infra notes 148-170 and accompanying text for a discussion of savings clauses in
loan documents.
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their very character may take them beyond the scope of Alamo
Lumber.
3.

Enforcement of Contingent Obligations

A lender holding guaranties or collateral pledges relating to loans
that arguably fall within the ambit of Alamo Lumber may have several options available to determine how to proceed against the collateral. First, and most simply, the lender may desire to "forge ahead"
and commence suit to recover under guaranties or take nonjudicial
action to enforce deeds of trust or personal property security agreements. The obvious danger in such a course of action is that the
lender may be deemed by a court, long after the fact, to have charged
or received usurious interest under Alamo Lumber, with the attendant
negative consequences of the Texas usury statutes applying with full
force.
A second possible course of action for a lender would be to rely on
any savings clauses contained in the promissory notes or related instruments. 146 Under such circumstances, the lender could attempt to
"effectuate" the savings clauses by realizing on guaranties or other
collateral pledges, making a determination as to whether any sums
should be rebated under applicable savings clauses and rebating all
such sums to the guarantor or pledgor. Taking such a course of action
outside the realm of judicial proceedings, however, may itself be
fraught with risk. In particular, the lender might make a determination as to appropriate interest or other calculations that would not be
supported in a subsequent judicial action.
A third alternative for a lender facing the Alamo Lumber issue in
the context of contingent obligations would be to seek judicial guidance in the form of a declaratory judgment as to the possible charge
or receipt of interest prior to making such a charge or receiving benefits from contingent obligations. In this manner, the savings clauses
contained in the loan documents could be effectuated via judicial action, with the relative certainty accompanying a judicial determination. Obviously, such a determination could be time-consuming and
expensive and, in many instances, unrealistic in light of both current
financial conditions in the business community and the delays often
associated with civil litigation in Texas courts. Indeed, the time and

146. Id.
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expense of litigation, considered with the possibility of a guarantor or
pledgor's rapidly deteriorating financial condition, could render this
alternative unrealistic at best. Further, a lender who obtained a judicial declaration of the propriety of a proposed course of action or construction of loan documents from a trial court could be subject to
liability in the event that the trial court's determination were overturned on appeal. Thus, it appears that no course of action is entirely
risk free.
C.

Possible Judicial Treatment of Contingent Obligations

As described above, contingent or secondary obligations such as
guaranties and collateral pledges differ from outright assumptions in
several respects. Texas courts have not yet determined whether guaranties and pledges should be treated like assumptions for purposes of
the Alamo Lumber rule. While certain guaranties or collateral pledges
may be the economic equivalents of an assumption, others represent
truly contingent obligations which, at the time of documentation of
the transaction, are not expected to require ultimate performance. In
these cases, Texas courts could choose to simply exclude the contingent obligations from the ambit of Alamo Lumber, rely upon the
"speculative and contingent" cases to avoid a determination of usury,
attempt to "value" the amount of compensation or "interest" represented by the contingent obligation or include as "interest" those
amounts ultimately charged or collected under the guaranties or
pledge instruments. Based upon the "inception of the contract" cases,
creditors will assert that a truly contingent obligation should not result in Alamo Lumber usury simply because the guarantor or pledgor
ultimately was required to make payments (either directly, or through
the liquidation of its collateral) to the lender. Also, because of the
difficulties of "valuing" a truly contingent obligation, courts may be
reluctant to play the valuation game. In order to provide some certainty in this area, courts should consider the following approach.
First, if a guaranty or collateral pledge is a disguised assumption, then
such guaranty or pledge may be treated as an assumption for purposes
of Alamo Lumber, subject to the limitations described above. 147 If a
guaranty or collateral pledge is given by a borrower, with respect to a
fresh (as opposed to a past due or defaulted) loan to another bor147. See infra Section V.B.
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rower, then the guaranty or collateral pledge should be excluded from
Alamo Lumber consideration. In addition, if the guaranty or collateral pledge is given to support an extension of credit (whether new, or
in the nature of a renewal, extension or modification) to a third party
which at the time of the transaction is solvent, has adequately secured
the extension of credit, or is otherwise financially able to pay the extension of credit, then the guaranty or collateral pledge should be excluded from Alamo Lumber consideration. Finally, subject to the
"assumption equivalent" rule suggested above, cross-guaranties provided by affiliated borrowers in connection with simultaneous renewals, extensions and modifications of their loans should be viewed as
given to induce the lender to extend credit to the party whose obligation is guaranteed or supported, rather than to extend credit to the
party providing the contingent support. Without some attempt to introduce certainty into the area of contingent obligations, Alamo Lumber threatens lenders with the prospect of significant and often
incalculable liability in loan workout or restructure transactions,
thereby creating the prospect that such transactions will be foregone
entirely.
V.

POSSIBLE DEFENSES AND RELATED MATTERS

The following is a summary of some potential defenses to an Alamo
Lumber claim by reliance on a savings clause in the applicable loan
documents and, for national banks, reliance on the provisions of the
National Bank Act. In a given usury case, other defenses (e.g. bona
fide error and de minimus non curat lex) may be helpful to a lender.
These defenses will not, however, be helpful in most Alamo Lumber
usury cases, and therefore are not addressed in the article. In addition, we have also provided a brief discussion of the related problems
of national banks and thrift institutions under the anti-tying provisions of applicable federal law.
A. Effect of Savings Clause in Loan Documents
Texas lenders typically insert into their loan agreements, notes, and
other loan and collateral documents, a clause, known as a "savings
clause," which expresses an intent on the part of the lender not to
violate applicable usury laws. A typical savings clause will provide
that, regardless of any other provisions in the loan documents, the
lender shall not be deemed to have contracted for, charged, received,
collected or applied interest on the loan in excess of the maximum
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rate or amount allowed under applicable law.' 4 8 In addition, a savings clause often will provide that any excessive interest shall be applied to the principal amount of the loan, and any remaining excess
refunded to the borrower. Also, many savings clauses include a provi-

sion for the spreading of the total amount of interest on the loan

throughout the term of the loan.' 41 9
A savings clause evidences the intent on the part of the parties to

148. The following is an example of a typical savings clause in a promissory note:
Regardless of any provisions contained herein, the Payee shall never be deemed to have
contracted for or be entitled to receive, collect or apply as interest on the Note, any
amount in excess of the highest lawful rate, and, in the event Payee ever receives, collects
or applies as interest any such excess, such amount which would be excessive interest shall
be applied to the reduction of the unpaid principal balance of this Note, and, if the principal balance of this Note is paid in full, any remaining excess shall forthwith be paid to
Maker. In determining whether or not the interest paid or payable under any specific
contingency exceeds the highest lawful rate, Maker and Payee shall, to the maximum
extent permitted under applicable law, (i) characterize any non-principal payment (other
than payments which are expressly designated as interest payments hereunder) as an expense, fee, or premium, rather than as interest, (ii) exclude voluntary prepayments and the
effect thereof, and (iii) spread the total amount of interest throughout the entire contemplated term of this Note so that the interest rate is uniform throughout such term. Some
savings clauses are more simple and merely state that the interest contracted for, charged
or received shall never exceed the maximum allowed by law.
See also J. NORTON & T. CONNOR, COMMERCIAL LOAN DOCUMENTATION GUIDE § 7.02 at
7-79 (1990) (example of a form of usury savings clause).
149. Courts in Texas and the Texas legislature have adopted the concept of the spreading
of interest over the term of the loan. In the absence of a savings clause, a court in Texas will
nevertheless spread interest on the loan over its term. In Tanner Development Co. v. Ferguson,
the Texas Supreme Court restated the rule that in testing a transaction for usury, the interest
stipulated by the parties and judicially determined interest are to be spread over the term of the
underlying loan. 561 S.W.2d 777, 786 (Tex. 1977) (affirming Nevels v. Harris, 129 Tex. 190,
196, 102 S.W.2d 1046, 1049 (1937)). In addition, the Texas legislature codified the spreading
doctrine for loans secured by real property. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.07(a)
(1987). Article 5069-1.07(a), which also includes a "savings clause" feature of applying excessive interest to principal or refunding such amounts to the borrower, provides that:
On any loan or agreement to loan secured or to be secured, in whole or in part, by a lien,
mortgage, security interest, or other interest in or with respect to any interest in real
property, determination of the rate of interest for the purpose of determining whether the
loan is usurious under all applicable Texas laws shall be made by amortizing, prorating,
allocating, and spreading, in equal parts during the period of the full stated term of the
loan, all interest at any time contracted for, charged, or received from the borrower in
connection with the loan. However, in the event the loan is paid in full by the borrower
prior to the end of the full stated term of the loan and the interest received for the actual
period of the existence of the loan exceeds the maximum lawful rate, the lender contracting for, charging, or receiving all such interest shall refund to the borrower the
amount of the excess or shall credit the amount of the excess against amounts owing
under the loan and shall not be subject to any of the penalties provided by law for contracting for, charging or receiving interest in excess of the maximum lawful rate. Id.
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limit the interest on a loan transaction to the amounts allowed by
applicable law.150 Texas courts have generally acknowledged the validity of such savings clauses and enforced them to avoid a violation
of applicable usury laws. 5 ' Courts will attempt to give effect to savings clauses if they are reasonably able to do so and will interpret such
clauses in such a way as to prevent the lender from collecting usurious
amounts under the loan. 15 2 Courts must construe the terms of savings
clauses as a whole and in light of the circumstances surrounding the
transaction. 153
On the other hand, a savings clause will not protect a lender if the
loan is usurious by its express terms or is usurious on its face. 154 In
order to be usurious on its face, a contract must show an intention to
charge interest at a greater rate than permitted by law. 55 For example, a note that expressly provides for interest of 25% per annum,
where the maximum rate under Texas law is 18%, is usurious on its
face. A lender under this note could not contract for, charge or receive interest at 25% and then rely on a savings clause to avoid a
usury claim. If, however, a note has a variable rate of interest that is
not necessarily usurious at the time of execution, then such note is not
usurious on its face by virtue of the fact that, because of increases in
the prime rate, the variable rate later exceeds the maximum statutory
rate. 56 A savings clause in such a note may be a defense to a claim of
usury if the rate of interest later becomes usurious.
As previously noted, a lender is subject to penalties under Texas
150. Nevels, 129 Tex. at 198, 102 S.W.2d at 1050.
151. See, e.g., Tanner Dev. Co., 561 S.W.2d at 777; Nevels, 129 Tex. at 197-98, 102
S.W.2d at 1049; Woodcrest Assoc., Ltd. v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp., 775 S.W.2d 434,
437 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied); Conte v. Greater Houston Bank, 641 S.W.2d 411,
418 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.); In re Casbeer, 793 F.2d 1436,
1447 (5th Cir. 1986); see also Imperial Corp. v. Frenchman's Creek Corp., 453 F.2d 1338, 1343
(5th Cir. 1972).
152. Nevels v. Harris, 129 Tex. 190, 197-8, 102 S.W.2d 1046, 1049-50 (1937); Woodcrest,
775 S.W.2d at 438.
153. Nevels, 129 Tex. at 197, 102 S.W.2d at 1049-50; Woodcrest, 775 S.W.2d at 438.
154. Nevels, 129 Tex. at 198, 102 S.W.2d at 1050. The court in Nevels stated that a lender
may not "exact from a borrower a contract that is usurious under its terms, and then relieve
himself of the pains and penalties visited by law upon such an act by merely writing into the
contract a disclaimer of any intention to do that which under his contract he has plainly
done." Id.
155. Allied Supplier & Erection, Inc. v. A. Baldwin & Co., Inc., 688 S.W.2d 156, 158
(Tex. App.-Beaumont 1985, no writ).
156. Cf. id. (where court held note that bore interest at prime plus 2%, with a 5% late
charge on past-due installments was not usurious on its face).
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law if it either "contracts for," "charges" or "receives" usurious inter-

est. 157 Savings clauses are typically used to defeat a claim that the

lender "contracted for" usurious interest. 118 Until recently, many
lenders in Texas were skeptical as to whether a savings clause would
prevent a "charge" from being usurious. A savings clause, however,

can also provide the lender a defense to a usury claim that it

"charged" usurious interest. In Woodcrest Associates, Ltd. v. Com-

monwealth Mortgage Corp.,159 the lender utilized a savings clause to
avoid a claim by the borrower that a demand letter the lender sent to
the borrower was a "charge" of usurious interest. I° The court con-

cluded that the "manifest intent of the parties was to structure the
entire transaction so as to avoid contracting for, charging, or receiving usurious interest."' 6 1 Accordingly, the savings clauses in the underlying documents eliminated the borrower's claim that usurious
162
interest was charged.
It is unclear whether a usury savings clause will insulate a lender
who receives usurious interest from a usury claim by returning such
interest to the borrower. The court in Nevels v. Harris stated that a
lender cannot "exact" usurious interest and by contract or disclaimer
avoid Texas usury laws.163 In a case not involving a savings clause, a
Texas court held that a lender may not collect usurious interest and
later credit back overpaid interest and overcome a violation of the

usury statutes. 164 But, consider a situation where a lender collects a

fee from the borrower that a court may later determine is "interest"
under Texas law. It would seem to be consistent with Texas case law

157. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06 (1987).
158. See, e.g., Conte v. Greater Houston Bank, 641 S.W.2d 411, 420 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist] 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (because of savings clause, demand feature of note did
not make loan usurious where borrower paid fees up front, which the court deemed to be
interest, but which when spread over the term of the loan were not usurious).
159. 775 S.W.2d 434, 434 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied).
160. Id. at 438-39. A "charge" of interest typically occurs by the unilateral act of the
lender, such as debiting of the borrower's account, giving a payoff quote, sending a demand
letter or including a demand for interest in pleadings. See, e.g., Danziger v. San Jacinto Sav.
Ass'n, 732 S.W.2d 300, 303 (Tex. 1987) (payoff quote); Windhorst v. Adcock Pipe & Supply,
547 S.W.2d 260, 260 (Tex. 1977) (debiting of borrower's account); Woodcrest, 775 S.W.2d at
437 (demand letter); Moore v. Sabine Nat'l Bank, 527 S.W.2d 209, 210 (Tex. Civ. App.Austin 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (pleadings and affidavits).
161. Woodcrest, 775 S.W.2d at 438-39.
162. Id. at 439.
163. Nevels v. Harris, 129 Tex. 190, 198, 102 S.W.2d 1046, 1050 (1937).
164. Danziger, 732 S.W.2d at 302.
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to hold that a savings clause prevents the amount from being usurious
if the amount of excess interest is, after applicable spreading principles are applied, offset against the principal, and then, if necessary,
refunded to the borrower. In such a situation, a court, in order to give
effect to the parties' stated intent not to contract for, charge or receive
usurious interest, should allow the lender to avoid liability under
Texas usury laws by such a rebate.
In an Alamo Lumber situation, a lender may be able to avoid a
usury claim by relying on a savings clause in the applicable loan documents. A loan in which a lender requires the borrower to assume a
third party's obligations should not be usurious on its face. 65 The
loan documents evidencing the new loan will include the stated
amount of the new loan and the lawful interest thereon, without any
reference to the amount of the obligation assumed by the borrower. If,
on the other hand, the loan agreement or other document incorporates the condition precedent that the borrower assume a third party's
indebtedness, as a condition to the new loan, then it is possible that a
court will hold that the loan is usurious on its face. Recall that an
Alamo Lumber claim involves a lender's requirement that a borrower
either pay, assume, guarantee or secure an obligation of a third party
to the lender. Whether a savings clause will be a defense to an Alamo
Lumber claim may depend on whether the court holds that the transaction is contracting for, charging or receiving usurious interest. If the
court concludes that there is contracting for usurious interest, then
there is a greater chance that the court will try to give effect to the
savings clause. If, on the other hand, the court concludes that the
lender has "charged" or "received" usurious interest, then it is unclear whether the savings clause will defeat a usury claim.
Assuming that all other elements of an Alamo Lumber claim are
present, a lender's requirement that the borrower assume, guarantee
or secure a third party's debt should be "contracting for" usurious
interest. Such a transaction is not "charging" usurious interest because "charging" typically involves the unilateral act of the lender,
such as demanding a usurious amount of interest or placing a debit on
the borrower's account. In addition, in the context of an assumption,
guarantee or collateralization, the lender is not "receiving" interest

165. See Alamo Lumber Co. v. Gold, 661 S.W.2d 926, 928 (Tex. 1984) (Barrow, J., dissenting). Justice Barrow, dissenting, in his analysis of intent, would require that there be usurious intent, if the loan is not usurious on its face. Id.
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until he either collects, or attempts to collect, from the assuming borrower or gurarantor, or forecloses upon the additional collateral. The
usury under these circumstances results from the parties' agreement
that the borrower assume, guarantee or secure a third party's debt.
Therefore, a court should hold that such an agreement represents
"contracting for" usurious intererst. The mere execution of loan documents that include an Alamo Lumber assumption should not be usurious if there is a savings clause included therein.
On the other hand, if the lender requires that the borrower pay a
third party's debt, then the lender has "received" usurious interest. In
addition, if the lender, after obtaining a borrower's assumption, guaranty or collateral to secure a third party's debt, collects the third
party's obligations from the borrower, the lender has received usurious interest. In such event, the lender may find it difficult to use a
savings clause to defeat a usury claim.
Unfortunately, Victoria Bank & Trust Co. v. Brady is the only
Texas case involving an Alamo Lumber claim where the lender raised
a savings clause as a defense.166 The court rejected the savings clause
as a defense, stating that there was no evidence "that the boilerplate
language found in the security agreement was ever in any way effectuated." 167 The court went on to state that "[t]he usurious interest was
charged; therefore, usury occurred.' 168 The court in Victoria incorrectly referred to Victoria's actions as the "charging" of usurious interest.169 Although the facts are slightly more complicated, Fancher,
by signing a note as co-maker, agreed to assume Brady's preexisting
indebtedness to Winter Garden. As a result, Victoria contracted for
usurious interest. Such a transaction would not be "charging" usurious interest because "charging" typically involves the unilateral act of
166. 779 S.W.2d 893, 901-02 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989, writ granted). See supra
notes 61-89 and accompanying text for a discussion of Victoria.
167. Id.
168. Id. (emphasis added).
169. Id. The court cited Danziger v. San Jacinto Savings Ass'n, which held that the
lender's payoff quote, reflecting interest greater than an amount allowed by law, was also a
usurious charge of interest. Danziger, 732 S.W.2d at 304. The court in Danziger stated that
"[tlhe mere charging of excessive interest constitutes usury." Id. This statement was in the
context of holding that the payoff quote was a usurious charge of interest and that it did not
matter that the debtor never paid to the lender the amount charged. Id. Danziger does not
involve an interpretation of whether a savings clause will prevent a charge of interest from
being usurious. Therefore, the court in Victoria appears to have mistakenly relied on the language in Danziger.
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the lender, such as demanding a usurious amount of interest or placing a debit on the borrower's account. Victoria did, however, collect
$40,000 from Fancher towards the indebtedness assumed; therefore,
Victoria actually collected or received amounts that the court held
were usurious. Therefore, the court should have held that the usury
savings clause prevented the assumption from being usurious. Once
Victoria collected such interest from Fancher, the savings clause may
be ineffective to prevent a usury claim as to the amount Victoria actually received from Fancher. 7 0
B.

National Bank Act

A national bank may take advantage of the provisions of the National Bank Act (the Act) in order to avoid or limit any penalties for
committing usury. Section 85 of the Act provides that any association
may charge interest at the greater of the rate allowed by law by the
laws of the state where the bank is located or at a rate based upon the
discount rate on 90-day commercial paper. 171 The Act also provides
that if a bank knowingly takes, receives, reserves, or charges usurious
interest, the bank shall forfeit the entire interest on the indebtedness.17 2 If the borrower pays usurious interest, he may recover back
twice the amount of the interest paid on the obligation."7 a
Therefore, in some instances, especially where there is "double
usury" requiring forfeiture of principal, a national bank may be sub170. This is because once a lender exacts usurious interest, he may not rely on a savings
clause to avoid a usury claim. Nevels v. Harris, 129 Tex. 190, 198, 102 S.W.2d 1046, 1050
(1937). In addition, if the transaction were a "charging" of usurious interest, a savings clause
may still defeat a usury claim. Woodcrest Assoc. Ltd. v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp., 775
S.W.2d 434, 437 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied).
171. 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1988). The Act provides that
[a]ny association may take, receive, reserve, and charge on any loan or discount made, or
upon any notes, bills of exchange, or other evidence of debt, interest at the rate allowed by
the laws of the State, Territory or District where the bank is located, or at a rate of I per
centum in excess of the discount rate on ninety-day commercial paper in effect at the
Federal reserve bank in the Federal reserve district where the bank is located, whichever
may be the greater .... Id.
172. Id. § 86. The Act provides that "[t]he taking, receiving, reserving, or charging a rate
of interest greater than is allowed by section 85 of this title, when knowingly done, shall be
deemed a forfeiture of the entire interest which the note, bill, or other evidence of debt carries
with it, or which has been agreed to be paid thereon." Id.
173. Id. § 86 provides that "[iun case the greater rate of interest has been paid, the person
by whom it has been paid, or his legal representatives, may recover back, in an action in the
nature of an action of debt, twice the amount of the interest thus paid from the association
taking or receiving the same ...." Id.
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ject to less severe penalties than under Texas usury laws. As previously noted, if a lender requires a borrower to pay, assume or provide
security for a third party's obligations to the lender, as a condition for
the making of a loan or the renewal of an existing loan, then, unless
the lender otherwise attempts to collect from the borrower on the assumption, guaranty or collateral, the lender will not have received,
and the borrower will not have paid, any interest on the loan. Thus,
the lender's penalty under the Act would be limited to the interest
contracted for on the loan, together with a penalty equal to twice the
amount of excess interest actually paid on the loan. These penalties
for a usurious transaction are significantly less than the Texas penalty
of three times the usurious interest contracted for, charged or received
174
and the possible forfeiture of principal.
C.

Anti-Tying Provisions of the Bank Holding Company Act
(BHCA) and the Thrift Institutions RestructuringAct
(TIRA)

Under the BHCA and the TIRA, national banks and thrift institutions are prohibited from conditioning an extension of credit on the
customer providing the bank additional credit, property, or services
other than that which is related to or usually provided in connection
with a loan. 175 A borrower may recover damages for a violation of
the anti-tying provisions and, if the customer can prove that the violation resulted in damage to the customer's business or property, treble
damages.' 76 Courts define an "extension of credit" subject to these
provisions broadly to include offering to refinance or extend a loan
1 77
and an agreement to forbear from collecting on a loan.
The additional credit, property, or services must also be a nontraditional banking practice.' 78 For example, a bank cannot require
the borrower to purchase real estate from the lender as a condition to
obtaining a loan to finance other real estate.' 79 In Nordic Bank PLC

174. See supra note 2 for a discussion of the statutory penalties under Texas law for usury
violations.
175. 12 U.S.C. § 1972 (1988); 12 U.S.C.A. § 1464(q) (West Supp. 1990).
176. 12 U.S.C. § 1975 (1988); 12 U.S.C.A. § 1464(q)(3) (West Supp. 1990).
177. See, e.g., AmeriFirst Properties, Inc. v. FDIC, 880 F.2d 821, 823-24 (5th Cir. 1989);
Bruce v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 837 F.2d 712, 718 (5th Cir. 1988).
178. 12 U.S.C. § 1975 (1988); 12 U.S.C.A. § 146 4(q)(1) (West Supp. 1990).
179. Sharkey v. Security Bank & Trust Co., 651 F. Supp. 1231, 1233 (D. Minn. 1987).
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v. Trend Group Ltd.,' the court stated that a lender's requirement
that a borrower, in exchange for an extension of credit, guarantee several loans for which the borrower was not previously obligated constituted a proper claim under the BHCA.18 Therefore, banks and
savings and loan associations which are considering whether to require a borrower to pay, assume, guarantee, or provide additional collateral for a third party's indebtedness to the lender must, in addition
to considering whether Alamo Lumber applies, consider whether the
transaction would violate the BHCA or the TIRA. The existence or
absence of an Alamo Lumber claim, however, does not preclude the
possibility of an additional violation of the anti-tying statutes. Similarly, violation or compliance with the anti-tying statutes does not
imply that the transaction is or is not usurious under Alamo Lumber.
D. Application of Alamo Lumber in FailedFinancialInstitution
Context
In recent years, numerous banks and thrift institutions in Texas
and throughout the United States have failed and have been placed
into receivership or conservatorship under the control of the FDIC,
FSLIC, and related governmental entities. Under established federal
common law and statutory principles, so-called "federal superpower
defenses" are available to the FDIC and its transferees. These superpower defenses could significantly affect the availability of an Alamo
Lumber claim to a borrower from a failed institution.
1. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)
To the' extent that a borrower's Alamo Lumber claim relies on unrecorded representations or side agreements made by officers or
agents of a failed financial institution, such claims are unenforceable
against the FDIC in either its corporate or receivership capacity
under 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e). Section 1823(e) provides:
[N]o agreement which tends to diminish or defeat the interest of the
Corporation in any asset acquired by it under this section or section
1821 of this title, either as security for a loan or by purchase or as receiver of any insured depository institution, shall be valid against the
Corporation unless such agreement (1) is in writing, (2) was executed
by the depository institution and any person claiming an adverse inter180. 619 F. Supp. 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
181. Id. at 557.
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est thereunder, including the obligor, contemporaneously with the acquisition of the asset by the depository institution, (3) was approved by
the board of directors of the depository institution or its loan committee, which approval shall be reflected in the minutes of said board or
committee, and (4) has been, continuously, from the time of its execution, an official record of the depository institution.182
Thus, unless the borrower's Alamo Lumber usury claim is formally
committed to writing and approved by the failed financial institution's
Board of Directors or Loan Committee, the Alamo Lumber claim is
unenforceable against the FDIC or related governmental entities.
2.

The D'Oench Doctrine

Similarly, a borrower's Alamo Lumber claim based on alleged oral
representations by the officers of a failed institution is unenforceable
against a successor institution taking assets via purchase and assumption or other assignment from the FDIC. The holding of the United
States Supreme Court in D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC,8 3 protects
both the FDIC and its assignees from claims arising from unrecorded
side agreements. In fact, 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) is a codification of the
Supreme Court's ruling in D'Oench. The Fifth Circuit has indicated
that D'Oench is the common law counterpart to Section 1823(e).114
Under applicable D'Oench analysis, "secret" agreements are those
which do not appear in the bank's records, and may constitute oral
representations or misrepresentations made by bank officers to a borrower. 8 5 Further, the term "agreement" has been extended to cover
the entire transaction between the parties.' 86 The first element of the
D'Oench doctrine is that the maker of a negotiable instrument or
other financial obligation lend himself to a secret scheme or arrangement.187 Borrowers have been held to have lent themselves to such a
scheme or arrangement by (i) entering into an oral agreement that
contradicts the express terms of the loan documents, 1 88 (ii) entering

182. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1823(e) (West 1989); see e.g., Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. 86, 92-93
(1987); Campbell Leasing v. FDIC, 901 F.2d 1244, 1248 (5th Cir. 1990); Bell & Murphy &
Assoc. v. InterFirst Bank Gateway, N.A., 894 F.2d 750, 752-53 (5th Cir. 1990).
183. 315 U.S.447 (1942).
184. Beighley v. FDIC, 868 F.2d 776, 784 (5th Cir. 1989).
185. Langley, 484 U.S. at 92-93.
186. Id. at 90-92.
187. D'Oench, 315 U.S. at 460.
188. FDIC v. Cardinal Oil Well Serv. Co., 837 F.2d 1369, 1372 (5th Cir. 1988).
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into an oral side agreement during a lending transaction,' 9 (iii) executing a facially unqualified note that is subject to an unwritten or
unrecorded condition upon its repayment,19° and (iv) leaving an unreyoked guaranty with a bank.' 9'
The second element of the D'Oench doctrine is that the secret
scheme or arrangement has a tendency to deceive the banking authorities. 92 The case law that has developed since D'Oench has broadened its scope and applicability. The D'Oench doctrine now estops
both makers and guarantors of promissory notes from asserting any
defense arising out of a fraudulent scheme, including fraudulent representations made to the maker or guarantor. 9 Further, the
D'Oench doctrine precludes both the assertion of certain defenses and
the assertion of some type of "secret agreement" as the basis for an
affirmative claim for relief.'94 It is also clear that the D'Oench doctrine is available to assignees from the FDIC. 9
Therefore, unless a borrower from a failed financial institution is
able to satisfy the requirements of Alamo Lumber through written
documents approved by the failed institution's Board of Directors or
Loan Committee, it would appear that any Alamo Lumber usury
claim would be barred as a matter of law against either the FDIC or
its assignees.
It should be noted that, even though the records of a failed bank
may include a promissory note evidencing a loan to a borrower as
well as a note or other instrument indicating the payment or assumption of a third party debt by that same borrower (presumably in another loan file), 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) and the D'Oench doctrine would
bar an Alamo Lumber usury claim unless written documentation contained in the records of the failed bank expressly demonstrates that
the payment or assumption of the third party debt was a condition of

189. FSLIC v. Lafayette Inv. Properties, Inc., 855 F.2d 196, 197-98 (5th Cir. 1988);
FSLIC v. Murray, 853 F.2d 1251, 1255 (5th Cir. 1988).
190. Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. 86, 93 (1987); D'Oench, Duhme Co. v. FDIC, 315
U.S.447, 459-60 (1942).
191. CardinalOil Well Serv. , 832 F.2d at 1372.
192. See Langley, 484 U.S. at 92; D'Oench, 315 U.S. at 460.
193. Langley, 484 U.S. at 92-93; Lafayette Inv. Properties,Inc., 855 F.2d at 198.
194. Kilpatrick v. Riddle, 907 F.2d 1523, 1526 (5th Cir. 1990); Beighley v. FDIC, 868
F.2d 776, 784 (5th Cir. 1989).
195. Kilpatrick, 907 F.2d at 1528; Porras v. Petroplex Say. Ass'n, 903 F.2d 379, 381 (5th
Cir. 1990); Campbell Leasing, Inc. v. FDIC, 901 F.2d 1244, 1248 (5th Cir. 1990).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

45

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 22 [2022], No. 4, Art. 2

ST MAR Y'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 22:829

the loan to the borrower. In Beighley v. FDIC, 96 the Fifth Circuit
noted that the borrower had introduced into evidence numerous documents from the failed bank's official records, which documents made
it possible to infer that the failed bank had agreed with the borrower
to finance a creditworthy buyer to purchase certain properties. 9 7
Nonetheless, the court rejected the claimed agreement, observing that
no written document stated the alleged financing agreement.1 98 As a
result, the alleged agreement was held to fall short of the requirements of 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) and D'Oench.' 99
In the Alamo Lumber context, a borrower seeking to avoid
D'Oench and/or 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) must, therefore, produce records
from the failed bank explicitly establishing that the borrower's payment or assumption of a third party debt was a condition of the extension or renewal of a loan to the borrower.
E.

Potential Legislative Relief

The legal and practical difficulties of applying the rule of Alamo
Lumber to cases in which a borrower is required to guarantee the
debts of another have resulted in legislative proposals designed to
clarify the usury picture. For example, House Bill 2498, a comprehensive usury bill introduced in the Texas legislature by Ashley
Smith, includes provisions designed to eliminate the possibility that a
borrower's guarantee of another's indebtedness would constitute interest on the borrower/guarantor's loan from the lender. 2 °° This bill
essentially provides that the term "interest" would not, for purposes
of Texas usury law, include a guaranty or any compensation received
by the lender pursuant to a guaranty. °1
The bill also defines "guaranty" broadly as an agreement whereby a
person (i) assumes, guarantees or otherwise becomes liable for the obligations of another, (ii) provides security for such obligations or (iii)
196. 868 F.2d 776 (5th Cir. 1989).
197. Id. at 782-83.

198. Id. at 783.
199. Id.; accord Bowen v. FDIC, 915 F.2d 1013, 1016-17 (5th Cir. 1990). The Bowen
court stated:
Simply put, transactions not reflected on the bank's books do not appear on the judicial
radar screen either .... Unrecorded agreements-those rooted in the loose soil of casual
transactions as much as those that spring from the malodorous loam of outright fraudare a threat to the ecology of the banking system that we can ill-afford.
200. Tex. H.B. 2498, 72nd Leg. (1991).
201. Id. § 10, art. 5069-1.15.
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agrees to purchase such obligation or property constituting security
for such obligations.20 2 This bill would have the effect of eliminating
most Alamo Lumber concerns for lenders in commercial transactions.
The bill, if passed, would become effective on September 1, 1991, and
would apply to any loan of money or other extension of credit made
or extended before, on or after the effective date, excluding transactions as to which litigation was filed prior to the effective date.20 3 As
of April 15, 1991, the bill has been favorably reported on by the committee reviewing its provisions. The House, however, has not otherwise taken any action on the bill.
VI.

CONCLUSION

As a result of the holding in Alamo Lumber, and the resulting interpretations and extensions thereof, lenders in Texas must carefully
examine the terms of potential transactions with their borrowers. A
lender that requires a borrower to assume a third party's debt as a
condition to a loan, or the renewal, extension, or modification of a
loan, may be subject to severe penalties under the Alamo Lumber doctrine. In addition, a lender must also consider the risks of requiring
that a borrower must, as a condition to an extension of credit, guarantee, or provide security for, a third party's indebtedness. The holding
in Victoria evidences the harsh penalties a lender may face in an
Alamo Lumber situation. Victoria also reveals a willingness on the
part of Texas courts to expand the case law interpreting Texas usury
laws to "protect" borrowers from usury. In many instances, the facts
of a transaction will meet the particular requirements of an Alamo
Lumber claim. Nevertheless, such transactions may not result in an
economic detriment to the borrower, nor do they provide an economic benefit to the lender. In such cases, it will be critical for the
lender to convince the court to look to the substance of the transaction and the purpose of Texas usury laws in order to reach the proper
result.
In a development which occurred just as this article was going to
press, a Texas Court of Appeals clarified the issue of whether or not
Alamo Lumber applies to a guaranty. In Bank of El Paso v. TO.
Stanley Boot Co., No. 08-90-00048-CV (Tex. App.-El Paso, April

202. Id. § 1, art. 5069-1.01(g).
203. Id. § 15.
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24, 1991, n.w.h.), the El Paso Court of Appeals refused to apply
Alamo Lumber to a guaranty. The court stated that Alamo Lumber is
applicable only when a lender requires a borrower to pay or assume a
third party's indebtedness as a condition to an extension of credit.
The court further stated that usury is a defense available only to the
obligor on a note and not to a guarantor.
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